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Abstract
In the literature the issue of the protection of stakeholder interests (of employees in particular) is 
usually considered in a static context: how should the institutions of corporate governance be 
shaped having  regard  to  already  existing  firms,  conforming  in  particular  to  some  subjective 
criteria of fairness and fair play. It is remarkable that no attention is usually paid to the basic fact 
that a company in order to exist must first be established, and that the founders-owners are the 
original shareholders. Moreover not necessarily the most appropriate protection of stakeholder 
interests can be provided by the institutions and practice of corporate governance, other specific 
kinds of legal  provisions may be more suitable. But rather than substitution complementarity 
prevails between different legal provisions protecting the interests of stakeholders (in particular 
employees)  and  the  stakeholder  protection  afforded  through  the  institutions  of  capital 
governance, conforming to the logic of the different "varieties of capitalism". An aspect that is 
emphasized in the  paper,  and is usually  overlooked,  are  the much higher  rates  of long-term 
unemployment associated with the continental European variety as compared with the Liberal 
Market  variety  of  the Anglo-Saxon tradition. But  the Scandinavian Social-Democratic market 
model gives the best of both worlds: low long-term unemployment rate and incidence, together 
with high degrees of employment protection.
1  Email:  chilosi@sp.unipi.it; address: Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, via Serafini 3, 56127 Pisa (Italy)
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1. Stakeholders, Externalities and Ethics
The operation of firms in general, and of corporations in particular, affects the interests 
of many, either by commission or by omission. The legal and conventional prescriptions on who 
is empowered to decide on behalf of a company, the rules of decision, how the legal documents 
concerning the life  of the company,  such as budget accounts,  product  information,  different 
types of  disclosures  are  formed and publicized deeply  affect  the  way  in  which the  different 
interests influenced by the activities of the company are impacted. At the same time the incentive 
structure that is created by these rules and the manner in which stakeholder interests are affected 
influence  the  overall  performance  of  firms  and  the  economy.  Among  the  different  possible 
stakeholder interests that are impacted by what a firm does or omits to do the law distinguishes 
those which are relevant from those that are not, and prescribes how the interests of the relevant 
stakeholders are to be considered and protected. This the law does implicitly, when it considers 
some external effects and ignores others. Indeed this is what the law does in general, since the 
consequences of human behaviour are often numerous, far-reaching and of diverse nature. For 
instance, turning to a very clear instance, albeit far from company law, modern Western family 
law ignores the external effects that the choice of a spouse produces for the rest of the family 
(parents, in particular). But in other legal systems the consideration of these external effects are 
paramount,  and  the  matching  decision  is  attributed  to  the  parents  and  not  to  the  spouses 
themselves. 
What are the criteria that guide the choice of the effects considered to be relevant? There 
are a number of possible alternative considerations, political, ethical, ideological etc. In the case 
of company  law,  the  most  relevant  issue  concerns  the  overall  economic  consequences  of 
alternative  regulations. But often considerations of morality  and desert prop in, which  should 
rather the domain of philosophers than  of  economists.  Even aside from specific  philosophical 
and ethical considerations it is obvious that those empowered to take decisions on behalf of the 
firm should be expected, alike any other individual, not to pursue activities that run against widely 
shared moral principles (such as resorting to hold-ups or deceit--for instance it should be ethically 
inadmissible to knowingly deceive an employee about his effective career prospects just in order 
to extract greater effort from him--or, looking at more extreme possibilities, to murder, however 
perfect, or blackmail). As the American Law Institute puts it: “the absence of a legal obligation to 
follow ethical principles does not mean that corporate  decision makers are not subject to the 
same ethical considerations as other members of society.”2 The sanction to unethical behaviour, 
when not provided by law,  is the domain of  social control. In the case of corporations  loss of 
reputation because of unethical behaviour can lead to adverse publicity, damaging public image 
and  goodwill. Unethical behaviour can be sanctioned by the parties wronged, if they have the 
opportunity to react, or cost the firm the economic consequences of reduced trustworthiness. Of 
course the legal sanction, if provided, would probably be more effective, potentially reinforcing 
the social one. But what is unethical behaviour is not always clear-cut and there are areas of 
uncertainty where moral and economic issues are blurred, and where the moral judgement cannot 
be taken independently of the perception of the  economic consequences of the rule that the 
judgement implies or proposes. For instance, for some it is unfair and immoral to lay off some 
employees (seen as stakeholders) simply because their employment is not profitable any more. 
The implied consequence of this assumed moral judgement is that this kind of behaviour should 
be made illegal. But what would the economic consequences of this rule be? The first is that the 
2 “Principles  of  Corporate  Governance:  Analysis  and  Recommendations”,  Philadelphia,  1992,  p.  82;  quoted  in 
Donaldson and Preston, 1995, p. 82
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expected cost of  hiring would increase and,  ceteris  paribus,  the demand for labour decrease, 
leading  to  lower  wages  and/or  higher  unemployment:  in  the  end  part  of  the  cost  of  not 
dismissing unprofitable employees would fall on the additional unemployed, what does not seem 
very ethical. If the burden of excessive employment leads to the demise of the firm, all employees 
are  eventually laid off and the argument against the rule becomes even stronger. Secondly, a 
mechanism leading to the allocation of labour where it is most productive would be blocked, 
with possible adverse consequences on productivity, wages and, again, employment. It is in this 
kind of blurred area, where ethical and economic considerations appear to collide that economic 
reasoning could prove to be the most useful, aiding to form an informed ethical judgement based 
on  the  acknowledgement  of  the  economic  consequences  of  some  assumed  ethical  rule,  as 
translated into corresponding legislation. Of course ethical rules vary according to epochs and 
civilizations.  Ethical rules that run against technological and economic progress lead to lesser 
increase in productivity and living standards; we have examples of ethical rules based on religious 
beliefs that, even in our modern secular world, are hampering scientific and economic advance.3 
Above all ethical convictions that clash with the basic foundations of a market economy (for 
instance, that any return to capital and enterprise is ethically unjustified being the consequence of 
“exploitation”, or that no employee should be ever dismissed) may induce  types of behaviour in 
contradiction with its thriving and progress. On the contrary some forms of general acceptance 
of some basic  principles of functioning can enhance the economic performance of  a market 
economy and lead, potentially at least, to the "the greatest welfare of the greatest number". But 
the  rules  of  the  game  can  vary  from  those  of  American  liberal  capitalism   to  those  of 
Scandinavian social-democracy and those of the German social market economy. In the latter 
case the collaborative attitude of the social partners founded on the acceptance of the basic tenets 
of the social market economy may contribute to explain Germany's economic success.
2. Who Are the Stakeholders and How Does the Legal System Take Into Account 
Their Interests? 
But then, who concretely are the stakeholders? First of all those who have a contractual 
relation (either explicit or implicit) with the firm4, such as the employees, who are protected by 
the labour code, or the creditors, who are protected by the civil and commercial codes and by the 
rules concerning the faithfulness and transparency of accounts.5 But the notion of stakeholders 
also implies some kind of consideration for interests that are outside specific legal protection and 
that should find some specific form of protection in the institutions of corporate governance.6 
According  to  Freeman  (1984)  the  notion  of  stakeholder  extends  to  include  “any  group  or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an organization’s objectives”.7 At 
3 Such as in stem cell or family planning research.
4 This  is  the  notion of  stakeholder  in  Freeman and Evan (1990,  p.  354):  according  to them “the  firm is  best 
conceptualized  as  a  set  of  multilateral  contracts  among  stakeholders”,  where  (p.  355)  “’contract’  should  be 
interpreted broadly to cover cases of ‘implicit contracts’”; they “distinguish ‘contract’ from one-shot exchanges, and 
intend it to stand for ’multiple transactions’ that require some governance mechanisms.”
5 The transparency rules are of particular relevance for creditors and for all sort of stakeholders, such as minority 
shareholders or contractors, as “sunshine is the best disinfectant” (Djankov et al., 2008, p. 436, echoing the famous 
sentence by Brandeis, 1914, ch. V: “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants”). 
6 Thus it becomes rather vague. For a consideration of who could be seen as possible stakeholders see for instance 
Donaldson and Preston, 1995, pp. 85-86.
7 Freeman, 1984, p. 46. It must be noted that the “affected” part was introduced by Freeman only because of the 
possibility that those affected by the organization would affect it in their turn. A previous definition by a 1963 
memorandum of the Stanford Research Institute, quoted by Freeman (1984, p. 31) refers to “those groups without 
whose support  the organization would cease to exist”,  such as “shareowners,  employees,  customers,  suppliers, 
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the same time the externalities that the operation of the company generates on people (possible 
“stakeholders”) who have no specific contractual relation with the firm enter in the scope of a 
number of legal provisions in defence of perceived public interests: such as environmental laws, 
public laws concerning the activities of the company relevant for local communities and public 
bodies, laws concerning the nature and quality of goods the company produces, anti-trust laws, 
and last but not least the criminal law, for preventing all sorts of criminal behaviour that can be 
committed in managing a corporation. Owing to the above, one may wonder whether there is any 
specific motive why the interest of stakeholders and of the public in general should be protected 
by the legal  provisions concerning corporate governance, rather than other specific  pieces of 
legislation such as, for instance, in the case of employees, the provisions of the labour code. At 
the same time the protection of the interest  of shareholders,  especially minority  shareholders 
(who can be considered as a kind of special stakeholders since they are deprived in practice of 
decisional power, aside from exit, in a context in which information is not only imperfect, but 
fundamentally  asymmetric)  traditionally  lies  at  the  very  heart  of  the  issue  of  corporate 
governance.8
3. The Instrumental Motive 
A first, but least interesting, approach to the stakeholder issue is the instrumental one, in 
the perspective of business administration. The fact that managers should take into account the 
interests of all whose behaviour is of consequence for the survival and growth of the firm is an 
obvious platitude, which lies at the core of the instrumental approach to stakeholder theory. The 
stakeholder  view of enterprise management expounded in Freeman (1984),  predating by two 
years  the  fortunate  book  by  Rappoport  (1986)  popularizing  the  notion of  shareholder  value 
(according to which the corporation must be run in the interest of shareholders, creating value on 
their behalf),  is not necessarily in contradiction with the notion of shareholder value, since it 
refers to the stakeholder perspective as a chapter of strategic management. According to Freeman 
(1984) for the most effective pursuit of the objectives of the organization managers should pay 
due attention to all those who may contribute to its success, whatever the success criteria are 
supposed to be (thus including shareholder value). For example, the efficiency wage theory itself 
could be looked at from the viewpoint of the instrumental stakeholder theory of the firm. Other 
aspects of personnel management theory, such as how to shape the structure of pay or careers, 
may be seen in the same perspective: obviously a good manager should take into account the 
interests  and  preferences  of  the  different  stakeholders  and  the  consequences  of  stakeholder 
behaviour on the attainment of the objectives assigned to the firm (such as profitability, or the 
long-term  value  of  the  firm,  as  argued  in Jensen,  2001).  But  there  is  nothing  particularly 
controversial about this. A more controversial and interesting aspect is the extent to which the 
various  stakeholder  interests  should  be  taken  into  account  per  se,  independently  of  their 
instrumental  value.9 A  particularly  interesting  problem  concerns  the  overall  economic 
consequences of different legal  rules relating to corporate governance, and the way in which 
alternative  systems  of  corporate  governance,  variously  taking into  consideration  “stakeholder 
interests”,  are associated to different  “varieties  of capitalism”,  and in particular  the extent to 
which  different  rules  and institutions  aiming  to  the  protection  of  stakeholders  may  be  in  a 
lenders  and  society”  (p.32),  thus  not  much  more  restrictive,  and  very  much  in  the  perspective  of  strategic 
management. 
8  On this see in particular Shleifer and Vishny, 1997.
9 For the consideration of the different possible aspects of stakeholder theory (descriptive, instrumental, normative, 
and managerial) and many references to the literature considering the different aspects, see Donaldson and Preston 
(1995).
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relationship  of  substitution  or  complementarity  among  themselves.10 As  shown  in  Hall  and 
Soskice (2001), complementary prevails. In particular the rules of corporate governance and the 
provisions of labour law dovetail rather than alternate in the defence of perceived labour rights. 
If  one  also  considers  other  aspects  of  corporate  governance,  such  as  those  concerning  the 
protection of minority shareholders, the degree of contestability of managerial powers and the 
discipline  of  financial  markets,  one  may  arrive  to  the  perception  of  two broad  varieties  of 
capitalism, Liberal Market Capitalism (of the Anglo-Saxon tradition) and Coordinated Market 
Capitalism  (the  continental  European  +  Japanese  tradition),  with  different  advantages  and 
disadvantages and various concrete results, which also very much depend on the specific varieties 
and  national  characteristics  of  the  countries  concerned.11 Taking  those  characteristics  into 
account Amable presents a more articulate classification,  distinguishing between five different 
types of varieties of capitalism, “neo-liberal or market-based capitalism; Continental European 
capitalism; social-democratic capitalism; ‘Mediterranean’ capitalism; and Asian capitalism”.12 Later 
on we shall  deal with the issue of the protection employees'  interests through labour market 
regulation, on the one hand, and through the institutions of corporate governance, on the other, 
and the  likely  consequences  on long-term unemployment.  In this  respect  Soskice  and Hall's 
distinction  between  coordinated  market  economies  and  liberal  market  economies  acquires 
paramount relevance. 
4. The Founders’ and Financiers’ Perspective 
Many  discussions  on  stakeholders  vs.  shareholders  concern  how  an  already  existing 
corporation should be best organized in order to take the interest of stakeholders into account.13 
But in order to function a company must first of all exist, and some measures which may appear 
to be justified having regard to the functioning of an already existing company can acquire a 
different perspective if the incentives and conditions relating to its founding are considered. A 
company arises from a contract between the partners. This is the consideration to start from. In 
the  founders’  perspective  we may  adopt  different  viewpoints:  how would the  founders  best 
formulate  the statutes  of  the company in  their  own interest?  And how should the  legislator 
constrain the formulation of the statutes from the perspective of the overall economic and social 
interests? In this the consequences on stakeholders should be taken into account, but also how 
the imposed legal constraints may impact on the incentives of the founders, and thus on a crucial 
decision affecting the supply of entrepreneurship: the decision to found a firm and to put one’s 
own  invested  resources  at  risk.14 Furthermore:  how  do  the  rules  and  objective  conditions 
10For the concept of institutional complementarities see for instance Armour and Deakin (2009).
11See Hall and Soskice (2001). As argued in Gatti et al. (2009) complementarity extends to the relation between the 
degree of coordination of the overall financial  regime and the degree of labour market regulation as far as the 
consequences on the aggregate unemployment rate are concerned. For the quantitative aspects of the two main 
varieties and of their national variations see also Damiani (2010). 
12Amable (2009, p. 20).
13As a clear-cut example see Donaldson and Preston (1995),  where the issue of stakeholder management is seen 
essentially  as an ethical  issue, without paying attention to the economic consequences of the different possible 
arrangements, and to the ethical implications of those consequences. What is remarkable of their thorough inquiry 
is that they do not consider the basic fact that a company in order to exist must be first be established, and that the 
founders-owners are the original shareholders. If the incentives they have for founding the company are wanting, 
because, say, the law privileges the interest of stakeholders over those of shareholders, the company will not be 
founded and therefore will not exist, or will have a smaller dimension. 
14An important aspect here is the extent of the complexity of the procedures needed to have a firm registered or a 
company incorporated. More exacting procedures can better guarantee some stakeholder interests that are affected 
by the company’s  very existence,  but  have a cost  in terms of  the  propensity  to found a company and supply 
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governing the subsequent life of a firm, in particular the degree of consideration of stakeholders’ 
interests vs. the interest of shareholders, impact not only on the incentives to create the firm in 
the first place, but also on the growth and further development of the firm? As an example of 
how the legal and environmental conditions affect the supply of entrepreneurship and the birth 
and growth of new firms we may refer to the relative abundance of venture capitalists and of so 
called “business angels” in the USA that is by no means matched under European conditions,15 
and  which  represents  an  important  supply  of  crucial  entrepreneurship,  especially  in 
technologically  advanced  and  innovative  firms.16 The  supply  of  venture  capital  and 
entrepreneurship is greatly favoured by the relative ease a successful initiative can be cashed in by 
going public in a stock market endowed with depth and a great deal of liquidity, and a partnership 
be established in the first place, in an institutional environment in which “employment at will” 
prevails and the labour market is relatively unregulated.17 The same conditions make much easier 
the solution to the problem of how to deal, for instance, with the time when the owners of a 
family  firm decide that it  is  time to grow above or outside the  family  limits  because  of the 
momentum of the growth of the firm or because of demographic reasons: The legal constraints 
and  the  overall  institutional  environment  affect  the  process  through  which  a  firm  may  be 
required to change its legal setup in ways compatible with its growth, a process akin to molting in 
the natural world. So, in order to determine the optimal setup of the rules that govern the life of 
the firm, in particular those that take into account the interests of the stakeholders, however 
defined, a dynamic approach should be taken, one that considers the possible development of the 
firm, from its birth and its growth, to its possible demise, without concentrating the attention on 
the static setup of an already existing firm, in particular a joint stock firm, at a certain moment of 
time, or even in a limited time span. In this, as in other discussions, what we may call the fallacy 
of the still frame is often committed: the idea that a given apparent state of the word, such as 
captured in a still picture, should persist, independently of the manipulations which are applied to 
the setup. In the real world instead of a still picture we have a frame, part of a movie that is 
evolving: how the movie carries on depends on the way the setup is changed. This happens in 
particular with respect to the number and types of firms and entrepreneurs: at a given point of 
time they are given, but what happens later depends, among others, on incentives. Obviously, 
entrepreneurial  incentives  are  affected  not  only  by  the  regulations  influencing  the  costs  and 
timing of entry and the rules concerning corporate governance, but also by the overall social and 
institutional framework, in particular by the rules that regulate the employment contract that in 
some way dovetail with the discipline of corporate governance itself.18 
5. Haziness of the Concept of Stakeholder Value  
The  great  disadvantage  with  stakeholder  value  (as  the  stakeholder  approach  is  often 
referred to in the literature)19 as a guide to managerial behaviour, alternative to shareholder value, 
is the haziness of the concept of stakeholder value, and of the basic concept of stakeholder itself. 
entrepreneurship and risk capital.
15Cf. OECD, 1998, pp. 18, 100.
16In particular “business angels”, who are as a rule experienced older entrepreneurs, not only are sharing in the USA 
in the entrepreneurial function of risk taking, but are involved in the assessment of entrepreneurial prospects and 
may variously affect the decisions relating to the running and development of the firm (cf. Chilosi, 2001, p. 329). 
17According Ilmakunnas and others (1999, p. 1) the rate of entrepreneurship is negatively related to union power in 
the economy. Analogous considerations apply to the various forms of legal labour protection (cf. OECD, 1998, pp. 
18–19). 
18On this see in particular Djankov, 2008.
19See in particular Charreaux and Desbrières, 2001, where the notion of stakeholder value is defined.
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This applies as well to the idea that the “management of the firm must be oriented to satisfying 
the interest of the entity itself, and not the interests of one of its constituents”.20 The idea that 
managers should be empowered and trusted to pursue stakeholder value (such as in Berle and 
Means’ 1932 approach, even if at the time the terminology was different) has the major flaw that 
stakeholders are many and their “values” indeterminate and indeterminable, just as the notion of 
the interest of the firm as such. This simply empowers the managers to do what they think fit 
independently  of  their  agency  relationships  with  the  formal  owners  of  the  firm  (the 
shareholders21), pretending that they are pursuing stakeholders’ interests.22 If managers are left as 
the  interpreters  and  guarantors  of  stakeholders  rights  this  can  lead  to  a  lot  of  haze  in  the 
assessment of managerial discretion and managerial results. In particular, enhancing managerial 
power may increase the power to skim the value created by the company to managers’  own 
benefit,  while  they  can  always  pretend  to  have  sacrificed  the  interest  of  shareholders  to 
stakeholders’ interest.23 At the same time politicians, as a particular category of stakeholders, can 
benefit  from the quid-pro-quo allowed by opaque arrangements with firms that have unclear 
objectives and possibly hazy budget constraints.24 And this can have a cost, in terms of lowering 
the interest of founders to found the company, of financiers to finance the company, of venture 
capitalists to launch venture capital initiatives with the prospect of being able to go public, and to 
have a return by going public for the more successful ventures, repaying the losses on the least 
successful.  The fact,  that  we have  already emphasized,  is  that  the  firm is  established by the 
shareholders  or  partners.  If  the firm is  supposed  to pursue  the  interests  of  different  parties 
(employees, local authorities, politicians etc.), rather than those of the partners themselves, we 
may fairly assume that the interest in establishing and financing a firm assuming the relative risks 
is reduced and so is the potential supply of entrepreneurship.25 One could object that minority 
shareholders usually do not offer much entrepreneurship, they perform as financiers rather than 
as entrepreneurs.26 But whenever their rights are less guaranteed the depth of the financial market 
suffers,  the  extent  to  which  firms  are  financed  through bank  credit  rather  than  risk  capital 
increases, the attractiveness of creating start-ups decreases. Finally the formation of shareholder 
value is tantamount to the pursuit of the profitability of the firm. Profits, the difference of the 
value of what a firm produces and what is accounted as cost, are the engine of the long-term 
20Aglietta and Rebérioux, 2005, p. 46.
21There are some (such as Aglietta and Rebérioux, 2005) who doubt that shareholders should be considered the real 
owners of the firm, but only as providers of finance capital alike banks or bondholders. One may note however 
that their legal role is that of partners in a partnership, and one may hardly dispute the fact that the partners are 
legal owners of a business, even if in the different partnerships and in the different legal systems the entitlements of 
the partners can be different, as well as the different partners’ decisional power in the running and development of 
the business.
22As  Jensen  (2001,  p.  10)  aptly  puts  it  “stakeholder  theory  politicizes  the  corporation  and  leaves  its  managers 
empowered to exercise their own preferences in spending the firm’s resources.”
23Donaldson and Preston (1995, p. 87) are dismissive on this point observing that “the conventional model of the 
corporation,  in  both  legal  and  managerial  forms,  has  failed  to  discipline  self-serving  managerial  behavior.“ 
However, if the consideration of the interest of stakeholders, instead of being trusted to managers, is taken care 
through  some stakeholder representation in governing bodies (as considered in the following section) this could 
lead to a reduction of managerial discretion, rather than to an enhancement.
24Alitalia  is  a  good case  in point.  In  the  case of  Alitalia  however  the  pathological  consequences of  stakeholder 
management  were  compounded  by  public  ownership  of  the  controlling  shares.  As  Gugler  (p.  203)  puts  it, 
commenting a thorough review of the economic consequences of different setups of corporate governance, “the 
evidence concerning state ownership is on the negative site”.
25This is bound to have an impact on the labour market since demand for labour is intrinsically derivative from the 
supply of entrepreneurship (the activity of launching as well as that of running a firm). Increasing the supply of 
entrepreneurship and its quality (which, among others, depends on the incentives for entrepreneurs to perform 
effectively) enhances the capability of the economy to create and maintain jobs. See on this Chilosi, 2001, p. 328. 
26This is stressed for instance by Aglietta e Rebérioux (2005).
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growth of the firm, which may be seen conforming both to the interest of shareholders as well as 
to the long interest  of the economy, albeit with all  the limitations and qualifications that are 
associated  to  the  intrinsic  imperfectly  competitive  nature  of  real  market  economies.27 The 
argument of proponents of the stakeholder view, such as Charreaux and Desbrières (2001), is 
that enterprise’s costs are not social costs because they include variable amounts of surplus (such 
as employees’ surplus) and therefore are different from opportunity costs, and that a great deal of 
the surplus for its stakeholders that is created or destroyed by the firm in its multifarious activities 
is not accounted for. For instance, when a firm scales or shuts down, the costs saved are not 
really equal to the opportunity costs;  only in the textbook model of the perfectly competitive 
economy it is otherwise. In practice the local communities lose and workers lose the difference 
between their wages and their reservation wages. There in general a definitive surplus loss that is 
not accounted for in the decisions of the firm. To this it can be replied  that concretely no better 
approximation  to  a  firm’s  social  costs  and  social  contribution  than  that  provided  by  its 
accountings seems to be possible and when proposing alternative rules of behaviour the implied 
structure of incentives and related economic consequences should be careful appraised. We have 
here what we may call  the golden rule  of  rules:  when a specific  policy measure  is  envisaged 
attention should be focused on the economic consequences of the rule that is implicitly asserted. 
For instance, should employment maintained at all costs? Should a firm ever be allowed to close 
a  plant  or  layoff  workers?  Should  employees  be  entitled  to  appoint  managers  instead  of 
shareholders?  If  these  rules  were  accepted  the  negative  consequences  on  productivity  and 
employment could be far reaching. But if we are not ready to accept these rules in general they 
should not be invoked either explicitly or implicitly in any single case, both for coherence and 
because the application in any single case validates the rules in the aggregate.
6. Stakeholder Representation in the Governing Bodies  
A way for taking into consideration the interest of stakeholders (or rather of some of 
them) that is more plausible than to trust to managers the balancing of the different stakeholders’ 
interests, à la Berle and Means,28 is to have stakeholders’ (in particular employees’) interests to be 
represented in the governing bodies, and the balancing of some of the different shareholder and 
stakeholder interests to be the result of the internal organizational dynamics of the firm. The 
representation of stakeholder interest could be either spontaneously engineered by the controlling 
blockholders  in  choosing  the  board  of  directors  (for  instance  by  giving  a  seat  to  bank 
representatives, as is often the case in the German governance system)29, or be legally imposed.30 
27For the notion of shareholder value and its limitations see Chilosi, Damiani, 2007.
28According to Berle and Means (1932, p. 356), managers should become “a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a 
variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the 
basis of public policy rather than private cupidity”. For them “public policy” would be the outcome of a program 
set forth by “corporate leaders”, “for  example  … comprising fair wages, security to employees, reasonable service 
to their  public,  and stabilization of  business” (p.  356).  This  conception could  be seen to find an institutional 
counterpart in the traditional Japanese corporate governance system, where there is no formal legally prescribed 
stakeholder  interest  representation,  but  informally  directors  are  bound  to  take  care  of  a  bundle  of  complex 
stakeholders interests.  The Japanese articulate framework of strong social  control may have been able to keep 
potentially arbitrary managerial power in check.
29For the literature debating the relevance of the presence of bank representatives in supervisory boards of German 
corporations see Fauver and Fuerst, pp. 680-81. One may note that, owing to the German widely practiced system 
of  vote  delegation  through  banks  by  dispersed  shareholders,  bank  representatives  in  corporate  boards  of 
theoretically wide held companies may be considered as representatives of the de facto controlling blockholders 
rather than of stakeholder interests as such (cf. Morck et al.,  p. 666).
30For a  synthetic  survey of  the  way in which concretely  these kinds of arrangements  are produced not  only  in 
Germany, but in a number of other countries see Allen et al. (2009), pp. 7-8.
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6.1. Stakeholder representation and implicit contracts 
A motive for having stakeholder interests represented in corporate governance could be 
to provide a kind of guarantee for implicit contracts stipulated with the workforce, but also with 
other  stakeholders,  such  as  customers  or  suppliers  (including  banks,  as  credit  and  financial 
services suppliers), or local authorities and the state. By their very nature implicit contracts cannot 
normally be enforced through the courts. Moreover, since they are not explicit their content may 
be unclear, and assumed to be different by the different parties involved. Thus it may be difficult 
to realize whether and to what extent they are fulfilled or not. Stakeholder representation, such as 
in company boards or in works councils, could be seen as a guarantee for their implementation 
and as a vehicle for reaching some kind of general consensus on their interpretation through 
steady interaction and communication by the representatives of the parties involved. This kind of 
representation would not necessarily be adversary to the interest of the owners in general, and of 
the founders in particular, because it could save on the cost and time of building trust and could 
help  in  creating  the  expectation  of  implicit  contracts  compliance.  The  implicit  assets  and 
liabilities, and the relations of trust built up implicitly by the firm with its stakeholders should be 
reflected in goodwill, and thus in the net value of the firm. 
6.2 Stakeholder representation as a control and collaboration device 
Employees’  representation  in  company  boards  could  bring  about  some  additional 
supervision of managerial  behaviour that,  because of the specific  information that employees 
have on the running of the companies, may also turn out to the advantage of non controlling 
shareholders, especially in case the employees who are represented are also shareholders:31 the 
informational exchange that employees’ representation may bring about could be to shareholders’ 
advantage because it could favour better informed managerial decisions and a more collaborative 
climate of industrial relations reducing the probability of industrial actions.32 The credible sharing 
of  information  ensured  by  codetermination  could  make  wage  claims  moderation  and 
deterioration of working conditions acceptable in case of enterprise difficulties.  Decentralized 
bargaining at the firm level in particular can take place in an atmosphere of greater trust, and 
Pareto  improving agreements  can  be  struck  more  easily.  This  has  been recently  the  case  in 
Germany’s metal industry, where workers have accepted increases in working hours at unchanged 
pay  in  exchange  for  employment  guarantees,  following  the  Pforzheim  agreement  of  2004 
(“mainly targeted at reducing costs at company level,  for instance, through an increase in the 
duration  of  working  hours  while  freezing  or  cutting  wages”,  leading  to  “controlled 
decentralization”).33 But  there is also the possibility  that insider  workers  and managers  could 
collude  against  shareholder  interests,  especially  of  minority  and  disperse  shareholders.34 
31“Labor representation introduces a highly informed monitor to the board that reduces managerial agency costs 
(such as shirking,  perk-taking,  and excessive  salaries)  and  private  benefits  of  blockholder  control”  (Faver and 
Fuerst,  p. 680).  As a matter of fact, according to the inquiry of Ginglinger et al.  (2009) on French companies 
“directors  elected  by employee shareholders unambiguously increase  firm  valuation  and  profitability”. There are 
some studies (cf. Coles et al. 2008) that show that insider directors may be beneficial to value creation, especially in 
high tech firms. But these refer to directors who are freely appointed rather than appointed on the basis of outside 
legal compulsion.
32Cf. Fauver and Fuerst (2006), p. 673.
33Ilsøe (2010), p. 40. 
34In the case of the German Mitbestimmung the power of insiders finds a limit in the countervailing power of strong 
blockholders.  The  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  on  the  overall  economic  consequences  of  the  German 
Mitbestimmung in particular, and of codetermination and of employee stock ownership and “voice” in general, 
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According  to  a  number  of  inquiries  considering  governance  systems  where  some  employee 
representation in corporate  boards is  legally  required,  employee representation appears  to  be 
beneficial for the creation of firm value, provided it does not exceed some threshold (say, one 
third of seats).35 One can wonder then why forms of employee representation have to be made 
compulsory at all; as long as they appear to be in the interest of shareholders one would expect to 
be present in the internal organization of companies, even without legal external compulsion. But 
as remarked long ago by Jensen and Meckling (1979, p. 473), “A striking fact about industrial 
democracy  is  that  it  cannot  be  effected  on  any  significant  scale  voluntarily.  Without  fiat, 
codetermination would be virtually nonexistent.” The case for legally mandated codetermination 
can be made if it can be shown that through its favourable external effects social partners could 
avoid being stuck in otherwise sub-optimal Nash equilibria, or because of some other  overall 
favourable consequences on the complex organization of society and the economy. Looking at 
the external effects a possible advantage of codetermination, as well as of profit participation 
remuneration schemes, is to have an additional party interested in the publicity and faithfulness 
of  the  accounts,  and  in  reigning  in  top  managers’  compensation,  to  the  advantage  both  of 
fairness, reduced inequalities,  and even of efficiency,  since “lean cats may run faster than fat 
cats”.36 Without compulsion a single firm engaging in co-determination when the others do not 
could be negatively affected.37 Among the externalities that systems of employee representation 
generate we could consider the pursuit of overall macroeconomic social and economic objectives 
such as in the architecture of the German social market system. The social compact implicit in 
the latter enhances the opportunities for macroeconomic collaboration between social partners, 
while at the same time microeconomic efficiency objectives are on the whole not jeopardized in 
the process, at least in firms where participation of inside stakeholders to the supervisory board is 
not too large. Depending on the social and economic setup there is always the possibility that at 
the  macroeconomic  level  the  enhancement  of  the  protection  of  the  interest  of  represented 
stakeholders, insiders in particular, could turn to the disadvantage of some weaker segments of 
society, such as consumers, or the unemployed (for instance by pushing for higher wages and 
better working conditions, reducing the opportunities for increasing employment). But this kind 
of outcome could be also the consequence of any other measure aimed at the protection of 
insiders, such as that provided in particular by the labour code.
7. Workers’ Representation Vs. Labour Code Protection
Indeed, not necessarily the best protection of the legitimate interests of stakeholders may be 
sought in the architecture of corporate governance, some other legal provisions could be more 
suitable. The defence of the interests of insider workers and of their firm-specific investment 
through employees’ representation in works councils or enterprise boards does not guarantee any 
appears to lead to complex and partially contradictory results. For a synthetic updated survey see Ginglinger et al., 
2009, pp. 5 f.
35Cf. Allen et al. (2009), pp. 26-27.
36Cf. Chilosi, Damiani (2007), p. 10. The reason lies in the potentially negative income effect of higher salaries on 
effort. For the markedly higher remunerations of top managers in relation to that of manual workers in the UK and 
especially in the USA in relation to Germany and Japan where forms of stakeholder control formally or informally 
apply see Damiani (2011), p. 224. According to a different view the high open remunerations of American top 
managers are matched elsewhere by the hidden advantages of control,  as borne out by the much higher  price 
associated  to  the  transfers  of  control  packets  of  shares  (cf.  Dyck  and  Zingales,  2004)  in  a  context  where 
blockholders can control the companies with a modicum of direct capital ownership, in particular through pyramid 
schemes (very widespread feature of capital market ouside USA and UK: see Morck, 2005), in a context of lower 
protection of minority shareholders, and lower contestability of corporate control. 
37Cf. Fauver and Fuerst, 2006, p. 679.
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given employee since, even omitting the possibility that the representatives be “captured” by the 
interest of management or of the owners, employees’ representatives may well act in defence of a 
subset  of  the  work  force  (such  as  those  endowed  with  lower  human  capital  and  lower 
remuneration, in case of an egalitarian viewpoint, or the reverse, in case of a more hierarchical 
perspective) rather than of the work force as a whole.38 The provisions of labour law may be in 
this respect a better instrument, since they apply to the protection of everybody’ rights in an 
employment contract.  But co-determination can be the counterpart of a social  bargain struck 
between  the  different  social  components  (in  particular  trade  unions  and  employers)  at  the 
political  level  towards exchanging some institutional  protection of insiders  (which could also 
favourably  affect  employment  stability  and  overall  working  conditions),  against  some overall 
political and social consensus and wage moderation, reducing the restrictive consequences on 
employment that one could otherwise expect from the protection of insider interests. In this may 
lie the essence of the German social market model enhancing collaborative rather than conflictual 
social attitudes between the different social partners, with overall better macroeconomic results 
than  in  other,  more  conflictual,  environments. Analogous  considerations  apply  to  the 
Scandinavian model of industrial relations. But one may speculate the extent to which this is the 
outcome of specific corporate governance and labour market institutions or rather of the specific 
social, political and national context.39
8. Insiders, Outsiders and Long-Term Unemployment
Privileging through the institutions of corporate governance and  the labour code the 
interest of entrenched insiders, such as blockholders and existing employees, can go against the 
interest of outsiders, such as would-be employees and minority shareholders. Protection of the 
interest  of  insider  workers  limits  the  mechanism  that  in  a  market  economy,  however  very 
imperfectly,  tends  to  shift  labour  wherever  in  the  economy  its  productivity  is  higher.  This, 
together  with  “decreased  work  intensity  among  the  employed”  and  “increased  worker 
absenteeism” can affect negatively overall  productivity (Skedinger, 2010, p. 7, see also p. 14). 
Moreover the studies surveyed by Skedinger, in his thorough review of the existing literature on 
the employment protection legislation and its economic consequences, “indicate that stringent 
employment protection leads to less dynamics in the economy” because “employee turnover is 
reduced by fewer firings and hirings, while structural change also goes more slowly due to less job 
creation and destruction, while exits and start-ups of firms are also reduced” (ibidem p. 14). At 
38The issue of firm specific investment is often emphasized to justify employees’ legal protection and the existence of 
internal labour markets. However the argument is not entirely persuasive. It is difficult to envisage any acquired 
skills that could not be used at least in some other firms of the same industry, except in the case of monopoly or 
strong market power, such as specific skills required by the state administration, or in state railways, or in IBM in its  
heydays.  Firm  specific  investment  appears  rather  to  be  concentrated  at  the  beginning  of  the  employment 
relationship: for instanced the cost of moving, of learning the rules and habits of the firm, to get knowing new 
colleagues, etc. Therefore there may be no need to incentivate its further building-up. An additional related factor 
refers to the information about the employees that the firm acquires in the course of their employment. Thus the 
worker can invest in acquiring reputation inside the firm which could not be easily transferable outside. But the 
investment is reciprocal: the firm too invests in acquiring specific information as to the quality of the worker and 
has an interest in protecting this specific investment, as well as past investment in training. This is a protection 
against unfair dismissals that occurs even without any specific legal protection. To that it could be added the loss of 
reputation endured by a firm among its own workforce in case of unfair dismissals; this loss of reputation does not 
occur  not  only  if  the  unfairness  of  the  dismissal  is  verifiable  (such as  in  the  case  of  legal  protection  against 
unjustified dismissals) but also in case it is simply observable (and not verifiable in court proceedings), allowing an 
extended leeway to firms to decide layoffs that are substantially, even if not verifiably, fair.
39 The specific national context of Denmark, enhancing overall trust in industrial relations, is emphasized by Ilsøe 
(2010).
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the same time protection enhances “employment prospects … for those who already are securely 
placed in the labour market, while the opposite holds for vulnerable groups, especially the youth. 
Employment protection therefore works as a regressive redistribution mechanism on the labour 
market” (ibidem, p. 7). The countries (such as Italy, Germany or France) where the protection of 
insiders is higher are also characterized by a markedly higher rate and incidence of long-term 
unemployment than the countries, such as the UK or USA, where protection of insiders is lower 
(with the notable exception of the Scandinavian countries).40 In  the ten years  1999-2008,  for 
instance,  the  average  long-term  rates  of  unemployment  (where  long-term  unemployment  is 
defined as unemployment of one year or longer) were as follows: USA 0.5; UK 1.3; Germany 4.7; 
France  3.4;  Italy  4.7.  More  extensive  data  averaged over  the  seventeen  years  1991-2007  are 
reported in Table 1, together with the OECD employment protection index,  averaged over the 
same years, in the last column.41 The countries are arranged in four different groups (according to 
Amable's,  2009, classification): the first  one corresponds the the Anglo-Saxon Liberal Market 
Economies (LME), as defined in Hall and Soskice (2001), the second corresponds to Continental 
Europe  coordinated  market  economies  (CME),  the  third  to  Mediterranean  Europe  market 
economies (MME), the fourth to the Scandinavian social-democrat market economies (SME). 
From an inspection of the data it is immediately obvious (as one would expect) the association of 
employment protection with higher level and incidence of long-term unemployment. With two 
exceptions.  First  of  all   there  are  two  outliers:  Ireland  presents  relatively  high  long-term 
unemployment rate and incidence together with low employment protection (but in more recent 
years the performance becomes more in line with that of the other LME), and Austria, where the 
reverse applies. But the most remarkable case is that of the Scandinavian countries where low 
long-term unemployment rate and incidence are associated with high degrees of employment 
protection.  Their  exceptional  labour  market  performance  could  be  attributed  to  specific 
institutional  factors such as “high unionization, highly coordinated wage bargaining geared to 
wage compression,  active labour market policies ...  More specifically,  the institutional  system, 
based  on  coordinated  negotiations  between   strong  partners  and  supporting  policies  by  the 
government, may be seen as a way of offering security to workers without some of the drawbacks 
of tight legislative labour market regulation” (Andersen et al., 2007, p. 40). In other terms social 
cohesion and centralized decisions bring about wage moderation to the extent of rendering high 
levels of employment protection compatible with low levels of unemployment. At the same time 
the notoriously very efficient active labour market policies result in low levels of the incidence of 
long-term unemployment. One may note from the data that in the USA, where “employment at 
will”  prevails  and  the  Employment  Protection  Index  is  the  lowest,  both  the  rate  and  the 
incidence of long-term unemployment are the lowest. Of course other factors could be relevant 
here, such as the extent and duration of unemployment benefits.42 The latter are different in the 
different countries considered (higher in Germany, but also in the UK, in relation to Italy, for 
instance, were they are particularly low). In general the comparison between different countries is 
made in terms of overall unemployment rates (such as in Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 20),43 but it is 
40For the data on long-term unemployment in the different countries the reader is referred to the ILO database, in 
the  KILM (Key  Indicators  of  the  Labour  Market),  6th  edition,  freely  accessible  and downloadable  from the  ILO 
Internet site. Some aggregate data are reported in Table 1.
41"Unweighted  average  of  version  1  sub-indicators  for  regular  contracts  (EPR_v1)  and  temporary  contracts 
(EPT_v1)", where EPR_v1 is "sub-indicator for dismissal of employees on regular contracts" and EPT_v1 is "sub-
indicator for strictness of regulation on temporary contracts" (OECD 2010).
42For the issue of omitted variables affecting the way in which employment protection impacts on employment and 
unemployment, see Skedinger, 2010, p. 88.
43This applies to various other studies that purport to determine the consequences of alternative institutional setups 
on unemployment, such as, recently, Amable (2009) or Gatti et al. (2009).
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long-term unemployment that represent the main source both of economic waste and of social 
suffering.  As  Machin  and  Manning  (1999,  p.  3085)  put  it  “one  should  recognise  that  the 
experience  of  long-term  unemployment  is  a  horrid  one  for  those  unfortunate  enough  to 
experience it”. Wherever, as in the LME, there is greater flexibility in the labour market and 
greater propensity to change jobs, this leads to higher labour mobility and hence to higher rates 
of frictional employment, which can be seen as functional to the greater dynamism of the labour 
market. As argued by Per Skedinger (2010, p. 7), “there is a great deal of evidence which indicates 
that both dismissals and hirings decrease at approximately the same rate” as a consequence of 
employment  protection.  At  the  same  time  “the  evidence  that  aggregate  employment  and 
unemployment are affected by such a regulation, whether positively or negatively, is relatively 
weak” (ibidem). But in a given rate of aggregate unemployment quite different rates of long-term 
and short-run unemployment could be hidden (see the different rates of incidence of long-term 
unemployment  in  Table  1).  Analogous  considerations  could  be  made  with  respect  to  the 
unemployment  rates  of  disadvantaged categories,  such as  in  particular  youth  unemployment. 
According to Hall and Soskice, (2001, p. 22) the greater capability of the LME to  create jobs 
(albeit on average less durable and with greater income inequalities) may be reflected in the higher 
full-time equivalent employment rate in relation to the CME.
Even  if  on  the  whole  labour  market  flexibility  is  associated  with  lower  long-term 
unemployment rates, it could be argued that some workers, even if unemployed, may prefer, if 
given the choice, a setup where the labour market is more rigid, unemployment higher, and the 
probability  for the unemployed to find a job lower, possibly  labour productivity and average 
wages lower, but once a job is found employees enjoy legal protection and a lifetime employment 
prospect,  and thus greater peace of mind.    However inquiries in the satisfaction provided by 
different  contractual  arrangements  in  different  normative  setups  do  not  surprisingly  report 
greater degrees of satisfaction and feeling of security for workers taking advantage of strong legal 
protection  of  their  permanent  employment  contract  (Skedinger,  2010,  pp.  8,  15).  Here  two 
circumstances can be relevant: the first is the awareness of the greater difficulty to find another 
job in case of layoffs;44 the other is what we may call the entrapment factor:45 the danger to end 
up trapped in a less preferred and less rewarding job than under an alternative, more flexible and 
less legally constrained labour relations system, owing to the greater risk of leaving one’s job and 
the difficulty in finding, once unemployed, a different, more suitable, one. More generally, labour 
market regulation weakens the allocative mechanism (such as  expounded by the hedonic theory 
of wages) through which workers tend to be allocated to jobs that they relatively  prefer and 
where they are relatively more productive. 
44The empirical studies surveyed by Skedinger “indicate that employees with permanent jobs perceive less security in 
countries with stricter legislation” (p. 118).
45Skedinger (2020, p. 116) refers to “locking-effects” induced by employment protection.
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Table 1. Long-term unemployment, employment protection, and the varieties of capitalism.
Country Long-term 
unemployment ratea
Long-term 
unemployment 
incidencea
Employment 
protection indexa
USA 0.52 9.45 0.21
UK 2.24 31.09 0.66
Canada 1.03 12.21 0.75
Australia 2.05 26.01 1.05
Ireland 4.54 47.33 0.98
Average 1.73 25.2 0.73
Germany 4.21 48.25 2.54
 France   3.8 39.66 3.01
 Belgium 4.48 55.91 2.52
Netherland 2.15 42.97 2.4
 Austria 1.23 25.75 2.13
Average 3.17 42.51 2.52
Italy 5.8 59.34 2.69
Spain 7.34 45.76 3.31
Greece 5.08 53.25 3.27
Portugal 2.47 43.66 3.67
Average 5.17 50.5 3.24
Denmark 1.52 24.36 1.71
Finland 2.9 26.61 2.08
Sweden 1.71 22.7 2.44
Norway 0.6 13.62 2.69
Average 1.68 15.73 2.23
aCountry averages for the 17 years 1991-2007. Source: ILO (2009);. last column: Oecd (2010). 
There is a possible mixed solution:whereby labour protection is restricted to a section 
only of the labour force.  This kind of  solution may be pursued de facto in the underground 
economy, where all  sorts of  legal provisions are not observed, or de jure whenever different 
labour contracts, in particular temporary employment contracts with lower legal protection, are 
allowed.  The advantage  in relation to complete flexibility  lies  in the  fact  that the  social  and 
economic costs of long-term unemployment could be lessened while maintaining for the lesser 
protected section of the labour force some prospects of being promoted to more stable and 
guaranteed employment. The structure of incentives that are created depends concretely on the 
perspective  of  temporary  employment  to  become  permanent.  This  is  slight  in  case  of  the 
prevalence  of  gross  substitution  between  temporary  and  permanent  jobs,  as  employers  may 
prefer  to  avoid incurring  the costs  of  more permanent  labour contracts,  even for  temporary 
employees they would have otherwise preferred to continue to hire, leading to their dismissal 
when the maximum legal length of temporary employment is reached. This may have negative 
productive consequences if  only because of the lower propensity  of temporary employees to 
invest in the employment relationship.46 Of course much would depend on how more onerous 
are the regular contracts in relation to a sequence of temporary ones.47
46 On the negative productivity consequences of short-term contracts see in particular Damiani, Pompei (2010).
47On the consequences of liberalizing short-term employment see Skedinger (2010), pp. 63-64, 107, 125-26.
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9. Politicians as Carers for Stakeholders’ Interests
A further approach to the defence of stakeholder interests is to have them trusted to the 
political establishment and public powers through intervention on a case by case basis, formally 
(such  as  through  golden  shares)  or  informally,  through  the  political  influence  exerted,  for 
instance,  with  the  leverage  of  publicly  owned  or  controlled  banks,  or  through  the  public 
regulatory capacity, or with the instruments of power twisting the rule of law (the Russian way). 
The record on this account does not look on the whole brilliant. Often, even when not directed 
towards milking resources for the pursuit of petty political interests, government interventions, 
allegedly for defending the interest of stakeholders, aim, in continental Europe in particular, to 
stimulate those decisions by firms that lead to higher employment, but especially to restrain the 
decisions  that  bring  about  employment  reductions.  Instances  are  the  encroachment  by  the 
German government on the destiny of the Opel GM subsidiary during the recent crisis, or that of 
the Italian government on the Fiat decision to close the Termini Imerese production plant, or the 
pluriannual Italian costly drama concerning the destiny of Alitalia. Interferences of this sort are 
bound to have  negative  consequences both on the  allocation of  scarce financial  and human 
resources and on entrepreneurial incentives, even if prima facie they may seem to be justified by 
serious social and public order concerns, and by the consideration of the short run difference 
between private and social costs. In appraising this kind of policy actions one should take into 
account,  as  argued  above,  the  overall  consequences  of  the  general  rules  that  are  implicitly 
asserted,  such  as:  «the  closure  of  any  given  plant,  however  unprofitable,  should  not  be 
permitted», or «the government should always do whatever it is in his power to avoid layoffs, 
even at the cost of covering the losses». The consequences of following this kind of rules on the 
propensity to invest in new initiatives, to hire, to open new plants, to maintain profitability, and 
on the  use  of  scarce  budgetary  resources can be  easily  guessed.  Moreover  we have  here  an 
obvious case where there is contradiction between the protection of insiders and the interest of 
outsiders, such as workers whose opportunities of finding an employment are thwarted by the 
misallocation of economic resources and the reduction of entrepreneurial incentives, taxpayers 
who are financing the subsidies for loss-making plants, recipients of social expenditure or social 
services whose supply is curtailed because of the alternative use of financial resources, etc. But in 
these cases the insiders are known, the outsiders are undetermined, and this, psychologically and 
politically, makes a lot of difference. Moreover there is the well known fact that politicians are 
often prone to be captured by organized interests rather than to be guided by the long term 
consequences of their policy actions. 
10. Minority Shareholders as Stakeholders
Minority and dispersed shareholders could be perceived as kind of stakeholders, rather 
than owners outright, whose interests are impacted by the decisions of controlling shareholders 
and top management. Indeed, as remarked above, part of the legal provisions affecting corporate 
governance,  such  as  those  concerning  the  publicity  and  fidelity  of  accounts,  are  aimed  in 
particular at protecting non-controlling shareholders (as well as creditors). More generally, the law 
provides guarantees for the co-owners each towards the others, and so its constraints may not be 
adverse, but rather favourable, to the forming of agreements establishing a company, as they may 
discipline  and prevent  ex-post  opportunistic  behaviour,  whilst  also protecting  other  types of 
stakeholders, such as creditors or the inland revenue and taxpayers. Contestability of corporate 
control is seen, for well known reasons, as a guarantee for non-controlling shareholders, as well 
as an instrument leading to a better allocation of productive resources. As well known, the rules 
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for enabling the non-controlling shareholders to benefit of the potential profitability of the firm 
by selling their shares to a bidder in public tender offers are devised on the one hand to allow the 
totality  of  shareholders  to  be  in  the  position  to take  advantage  of  the  bid,  and thus  of  the 
premium of control, and on the other to render the bids more onerous, avoiding an excessive 
instability in corporate administration and a tendency towards excessive short-termism (such as 
having managers  to be  all  too dependent on the  continuously changing moods of the  stock 
exchange  instead  of  planning  for  the  long  term),  but  it  may  throw  in  prohibitive  obstacles 
towards the challenging of consolidated positions. As often is the case, there are no clear-cut 
answers, only trade-offs. 
11. Conclusion
In the end one should always be aware that the economic consequences of alternative 
legal  disciplines  in  the  different  institutional  and social  contexts  may be  quite  different.48 In 
particular this applies to the mix of formal rules affecting corporate governance and stakeholder 
interests, in their interaction with the informal rules characterizing the social framework. As an 
instance of the fallacy of composition, rules apparently in favour of some stakeholders do not 
necessarily  have  unambiguous  favourable  consequences  on  the  category  to  which  the 
stakeholders  belong.  For  instance,  security  of  tenure  in  employment  may  have  important 
productivity  consequences  (by  limiting  incentives  and blocking  an  important  mechanism for 
reallocating  resources  where  they  may be more productive) that  may (or  may not,  as  in  the 
Scandinavian case) turn against workers’ living standards and opportunities of employment. Or, 
going to a hypothetical extreme, a rule empowering employees instead of shareholders to appoint 
a controlling majority of directors would certainly be to the disadvantage of workers in general: 
such a rule could respond to the ethical principles of someone, but would be disastrous for the 
category the rule itself would seem to protect. Who would invest, create firms and jobs under 
those  circumstances?  At  the  same  time  the  approach  to  stakeholder  theory  privileging  the 
defence of stakeholder interests as opposed to value creation may work as a powerful ideological 
instrument for favouring special interests, such as of managers wishing to escape the constraints 
of  the  market  for  corporate  control,  or  of  politicians  wishing  to  exert  political  power  and 
influence through their interference in the running of firms, to the detriment of what could be 
perceived as the general interest.
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